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Editor's Note: The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is in the news and in the courts. On January 
JS, the headline read "Mamaroneck village to pay $4. 75M to yeshiva." The settlement agreement brings to an end a five-year dispute 
between the Westchester Day School and the village. The village spent more than $900,000 in legal fees fighting the Orthodox Jewish 
school's expansion project. How might this RLUIPA battle have been avoided? This month's commentary addresses that question-not 
specifically the Mamaroneck battle but in general: What should a local government attorney know about RLUIPA to (hopefully) 
avoid a RLUIPA claim? This commentary will be part of a new book about RLUIPA to be published later this year by the American 
Bar Association, with cosponsorship by the American Planning Association. 
How to Avoid a "Holy War" - Dealing 
With Potential RLUIPA Claims 
Alan C. Weinstein 
INTRODUCTION 
RLUIPA1 was signed into law by 
President Clinton on September 22, 
2000. Almost immediately, churches2 in 
every section of the country began to 
use the statute to challenge local govern-
ment decisions they viewed as obstacles 
to how they could develop or use their 
properties.3 In the succeeding years, 
hardly a week has gone by without at 
least one news story announcing that a 
church, synagogue, temple, mosque, or 
religious school is claiming that its right 
to religious freedom is being infringed 
upon by local government land use regu-
lations that violate the statute. 
While some RLUIPA claims have 
verged on the frivolous,4 many disputes 
pose serious questions about how local 
governments should balance the goals 
of land use regulations and the reli-
gious mission of churches in the con-
text of a society experiencing rapid cul-
tural and demographic change. 
UNDERSTANDING RLUIPA CLAIMS: THE 
LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL 
LANDSCAPE 
Local government officials need to un-
derstand that the "landscape" they will 
have to navigate when seeking to avoid 
a RLUIPA claim has legal, political, and 
social dimensions. Legally, RLUIPA 
claims occupy a middle ground between 
challenges to land use regulations in 
which government is presumed to have 
acted lawfully and challenges in which 
government does not have the benefit of 
that presumption. 
Most land use regulation disputes 
involve either: (a) plans by a property 
owner or developer to intensify the use 
of a given property which the city 
and/or neighbors oppose, or (b) efforts 
by the city or neighbors to impose ad-
ditional restrictions on the use of a 
given property, which the owner or de-
veloper opposes. Because such dis-
putes normally involve "economic 
rights," local government regulatory ac-
tions are presumed to be constitutional 
and parties challenging the government 
action, typically under the taking, due 
process, or equal protection clauses of 
the state or federal constitution, must 
overcome that presumption. 
A less common type of dispute in-
volves challenges to land use regulations 
based on a claim that they intrude im-
permissibly on rights guaranteed under 
the First and 14th amendments of the 
Constitution, such as freedom of speech 
or religion. Typically, these disputes arise 
when the government seeks to regulate 
signs and billboards, adult entertainment 
businesses, or religious institutions. In 
these cases, government does not re-
ceive the benefit of a presumption that 
its regulations are constitutional. 
RLUIPA claims occupy a legal posi-
tion in between these two types of dis-
putes. With one significant exception, 
once a plaintiff produces prima facie 
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1. Religious Land Use and 
lnstttutionalized Persons Act, Pub. 
L No. 106-274, codified at 42 
u.s.c. § 2000cc (2000). 
The Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty filed a lawsuit under 
RLUIPA in Haven Shores Cmty. 
Church v. City of Grand Haven. 
Mich., No. 1 :OO-CV-175 (W.D. 
Mich. S.D. 20CIJ). See "Becket 
Fund files action under new fed-
eral law." at http://www.becket-
fund.org/index.php/article/186. 
html. The first RLUIPA decision on 
the law was enacted; see 
Shepherd Mootessori Center Milan 
v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 2001 
WL 34137899 (Mich. Cir. Ct.). The 
first reported decision appaared 
later that same mooth; see Civil 
Liberties for Urban Believers 
(C.L.U.B.) v. City of Chicago, 157 
F.Supp.2d 903 (N.D.111. 2001 ). 
Plains, 202 F.R.D. 402 (S.O.N.Y. 
2001) (ruling that city's denial of 
a permit to construct a transmis-
sion tower on a golf course did 
not invoke RLUIPA jurisdiction for 
a neighboring synagogue seek-
ing to Intervene In a plaintiff tele-
phone company's challenge to 
the deniaQ. 
and coeditor of Land Use & the 
Constitution. 
2. I wiU use the term "church" as 
shorthand for all houses of wor-
ship or other religious institutions 
when speaking about such uses 
generally. 
3. A mere four days after the bill 
was signed by President Clinton, 
· Westlaw was dated March 13, 
2001, less than six months after 
4. See, e.g., Omnipoint 
Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of White 
Where previous generations attended houses of worship in their 
own neighborhood, commentators have noted that today, "religious 
institutions serve populations that are less and less centered in the 
geographic communities in which they are located." 
evidence to support an alleged 
RLUIPA violation, local government 
cannot claim a presumption that its reg-
ulation is lawful, but rather bears the 
burden of persuading the court that the 
challenged regulation should be up-
held. 5 The one significant exception 
involves a claim that a land use regula-
tion imposes a "substantial burden" on 
the plaintiffs exercise of religion. In 
that case, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of persuading the court that the regula-
tion in fact has that effect. Meeting 
that burden of persuasion has proved 
difficult. 
A second aspect of RLUIPA's "legal 
landscape" -the availability of expert 
legal assistance for RLUIPA plaintiffs 
from "public interest law firms"-is 
related to the political and social land-
scape. In recent decades, social and po-
litical debate over the proper relation-
ship between religion and government 
in American society has played out in 
our media, at the ballot box, and in our 
legislatures and courtrooms. In all of 
these forums, advocates for the strict 
separation of church and state argue 
that religion deserves no "special treat-
ment" from government, while propo-
nents of a larger role for religion in soci-
ety contend that government should, at 
a bare minimum, accommodate the 
needs of religious institutions and prac-
titioners. At the local level, these differ-
ing perspectives have often led to dis-
putes about the application of local 
zoning and historic preservation ordi-
nances to houses of worship and other 
religious uses of property. 
This debate, like many others in our 
society, is carried on to a significant de-
gree by "interest groups" on both sides 
of the issue. 6 One of these groups, The 
Becket Fund, which strongly favors the 
accommodation position, has effectively 
established a "public interest law firm" 
to provide litigation support for churches 
that are considering a RLUIPA claim.7 
The Fund's attorneys have assisted local 
counsel or participated directly in scores 
of RLUIPA cases. As a result, local gov-
ernments should anticipate that any po-
tential RLUIPA plaintiff will be repre-
sented, normally pro bono, by 
prominent local counsel with expert as-
sistance from The Becket Fund or other 
public interest attorneys. In addition, the 
fact that RLUIPA provides for an award 
of attorneys fees to a winning church-
even when the church's attorneys agreed 
to handle the matter pro bono---0nly 
adds to a city's concern that it may not 
only lose a RLUIPA challenge but be as-
sessed significant attorneys fees to boot. 
Although it is certainly not a "pub-
lic interest" law firm, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice has also come to play--
a prominent role in RLUIPA litiga-
tion. The Bush administration has 
placed RLUIPA enforcement high on 
the agenda of the Justice Department 
and, through 2006, lawyers in its 
Housing and Civil Rights Division 
had inquired into approximately 80 
RLUIPA matters, opened more than 
25 formal investigations (a significant 
number of which resulted in a favor-
able outcome for the complainant) and 
filed three cases in federal cour.t 
against local govemments.8 
Another aspect of the political and 
social landscape for RLUIPA claims is 
that disputes over the application of 
local zoning and historic preservation 
ordinances to houses of worship and 
other "religious" uses of property have 
been escalating. Obviously, the enact-
ment of RLUIPA itself has played a 
major role in that escalation, but there 
are larger factors at work that predate 
RLUIPA. 
First, houses of worship today are 
more likely to be perceived as inflict-
ing negative effects on neighboring 
properties. New churches, and older 
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ones seeking to expand an existing 
use, often are significantly larger than 
the churches of earlier eras and use 
their facilities more intensively. In 
addition to religious services, many 
churches· sponsor a school, day care 
center, adult education classes, a vari-
ety of programming serving different 
age groups, and various faith-based 
"support" groups. Some churches also 
provide shelter for the homeless and 
meals for the indigent. Many houses of 
worship also have venues where wed-
ding receptions or bar/bat mitzvah cel-
ebrations are held late into the night 
on weekends. As church activities ex-
pand to 12 or more hours per day 
seven days a week, neighbors become 
increasingly concerned about the nega-
- tive effects of the increased traffic, 
parking, noise, and late-night activity 
on property values. 
Of course, any new or expanded 
"non-residential" development pro-
posed for a residential neighborhood-
the traditional locale for houses of 
worship-is likely to be opposed by 
neighbors. But the classic "NIMBY" 
phenomenon poses additional difficul-
ties with respect to houses of worship 
because of recent changes in the 
manner in which Americans worship. 
Where previous generations attended 
houses of worship in their own neigh-
borhood, commentators have noted 
that today, "religious institutions serve 
populations that are less and less cen-
tered in the geographic communities in 
which they are located."9 Thus, the 
proposed house of worship is likely to 
be seen by its neighbors as providing 
few benefits-since most of them will 
not be members-while imposing on 
them the burdens associated with any 
more intense land use, such as in-
creased traffic, parking difficulties, 
noise, and the possibility of negative 
effects on property values. 
5. RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) 
6. For example, Americans United 
for the Separation of Church and 
State, http://www.au.org, on 
the strict separation side, and 
The Becket Fund.' http://www. 
becketfund.org, on the accommo-
dation side. 
website state: "The Becket Fund liti-
gates to protect the free expression 
of all religious traditions, both in the 
United States and abroad. In our first 
ten years, wa have represented peo-
ple of faith literally from A to Z -
Anglicans, Zoroastrians, and virtually 
everyone In between-as both pn-
mary counsel and amlcus curiae, in 
federal and state trial and appellate 
courts, throughout the United States. 
We have developed expertise In all 
areas of religious freedom law, but 
especially under the Free Speech, 
Free Exercise, and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution." http://www. 
becketlund.org/index.php/case/ 
9. Marc D. Stern, Zoning for 
Churches: Guidelines, But No Magic 
Fonmula' 7 RESPONSrvE CruMuNTTY 
No. 3 at 69, 70 (1997). 
7. The introductory materials in the 
'Litigation" section of the Fund's 
8. Report of the U.S. Dept. of 
Justice Housing and Civil Rights 
Division at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
crt/actMty.html. 
Local officials may also be concerned about erosion of the city's 
tax base if too much property is acquired by tax-exempt religious 
institutions. 
The rapidly increasing scope of our 
religious diversity may also be a factor 
in some land use disputes involving re-
ligious institutions. Traditionally the 
major religious institutions in most 
American communities were those af-
filiated with the Catholic Church or 
"mainstream" Protestant.denomina-
tions such as Lutheran, Baptist, 
Methodist, and Presbyterian, with 
larger cities also home to a variety of 
Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, and smaller 
Christian denominations. In contrast, 
today's fastest-growing religious 
groups-Mormon, Evangelical 
Christian, Orthodox Muslim, Hindu, 
Sikh, Buddhist, and ultra-Orthodox 
Judaism-which previously were either 
geographically isolated (e.g., the 
Mormons in Utah and ultra-Orthodox 
Jews in New York City) or a minor 
presence until their numbers were .. 
swelled by recent immigrants (Hindus, 
Buddhists, Sikhs, and Muslims)10-
now may be found in almost any 
American community. 
At times, the entry of such "non-
mainstream" groups into a commu-
nity--or the local community's reaction 
to it--can lead to land use conflicts. A 
study of all reported cases in the zon-
ing and land use context claims that its 
findings "strongly suggest that a high 
percentage of cases are being contested 
by religious groups comprising a very 
small percentage of the total popula-
tion." 11 Why is this so? On the one 
hand, the arrival of a new religious de-
nomination-if it is small and impecu-
nious--can lead to conflict if the mem-
bers of the fledgling congregation seek 
to worship and study regularly in a pri-
vate home or a rented storefront and 
the neighbors or local officials claim 
the property is not zoned for use as a 
house of worship. 
On the other hand, when a well-
funded religious denomination arrives 
and seeks approval for a new, large 
house of worship--a Mormon temple12 
or a "big box church" 13 being paradig-
matic cases-neighbors or local officials 
may again object, citing such traditional 
_zoning concerns as effect on.property 
values, traffic, parking, landscaping, 
etc. as the basis for their opposition. 
Local officials may also be concerned 
about erosion of the city's tax base if 
too much property is acquired by tax-
exempt religious institutions. Regret-
tably, conflict may sometimes arise as a 
result of citizens' and local officials' an-
tipathy for, and resulting discriminatory 
actions toward, the newly arrived, or 
rapidly expanding, denomination. 14 
HOW DOES RLUIPA AFFECT LAND USE 
REGULATION? 
RLUIPA can be implicated in several 
ways when a local land use regulation 
is applied to a church. First, RLUIPA 
has a "general rule" calling for strict ju-
dicial scrutiny of'land use regulations 
that impose a "substantial burden" on 
religious exercise. RL UIPA also pro-
vides that local land use regulations 
must: grant "equal treatment" to a reli-
gious assembly or institution; not dis-
criminate against any assembly or 
institution on the basis of religion or 
religious denomination; and not impose 
or implement a land use regulation that 
totally excludes religious assemblies 
from a jurisdiction or unreasonably lim-
its religious assemblies, institutions, or 
structures within a jurisdiction. 
RLUIPA's general rule prohibits a 
local government from imposing or im-
plementing a "land use regulation" in a 
manner that imposes a "substantial 
burden" on the "religious exercise" of 
a person, including a religious assembly 
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or institution, unless the government 
can demonstrate that imposition of the 
burden is in furtherance of a "com-
pelling governmental interest" and is 
the "least restrictive means of further-
ing" that interest. 15 RLUIPA defines 
"land use regulation" as a "zoning or 
.land:marking.law,_or_.the.application.of 
such a law, that limits or restricts a 
claimant's use or development of land 
(including a structure affixed to land), 
if the claimant has an ownership, lease-
hold, easement, servitude, or other 
property interest in the regulated land 
or a contract or option to acquire such 
an interest." 16 RLUIPA defines "reli-
gious exercise" both in general terms-
"any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a sys-
tem of religious belief' 17 -and by 
means of a rule: "The use, building, or 
conversion of real property for the pur-
pose of religious exercise shall be con-
sidered to be religious exercise of the 
person or entity that uses or intends to 
use the property for that purpose." 18 
RL UIPA's general rule does not, 
however, define "substantial burden." 
RLUIPA's congressional sponsors made 
it clear that this omission was inten-
tional: "The Act does not include a 
definition of the term 'substantial bur-
den' because it is not the intent of this 
Act to create a new standard for the 
definition of substantial burden on reli-
gious exercise. Instead, that term as 
used in the Act should be interpreted 
by reference to Supreme Court ju-
risprudence." 19 In short, the general 
rule mandates that once a RLUIPA 
plaintiff demonstrates that a land use 
regulation imposes a substantial burden 
on the exercise of religion, the court 
must apply strict scrutiny in judging 
the validity of the challenged land use 
regulation. 
10. For example, in 1990, the Na· and Matthew K. Richards, The (November 1996) (discussing the 'mostly unfavorable' or 'very unfavor· sire not to have the minority sect's 
tional Survey of Religious ldentifl· Need for Legislation to Enshrine emergence of "megachurches" that able" opinions of 'religious funda· church as a ne;ghbor." Douglas 
cation (NSRQ, conducted by the Free Exercise in the I.End Use can have substantial impacts on rnentaflsts,' and 86 percent admitted Laycock, State RFRAs and I.End 
Graduate School of the City Univer· Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS l. Rev. 725, surrounding land uses). to mostly or very unfavorable opin· Use Utigation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L Rev. 
sity of New Yori<, estimated the 736 (1999). Id. at 7 40. 14. Professor Douglas Laycock Ions of 'members ol religious cults or 755, 760 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
number of Musiims in the Unrred 12. See, e.g., Martin v. The Corp. of notes that there is suspicion of, or sects.' In 1989, 30 percent of Ameri· 15. 42 U.S.CA § 2000cc·(a). 
States at 527,000. A decadle later, the PresidD1g Bishop of the Church of hostility to, religious intensity. cans said they would not like to have 16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc·5(5). 
the 2000 e<frtion of the Yearbook of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 "People who are religious them· 'religious fundamentalists' as ooigh· 
American and ca'nadian Churches Mass. 141 (2001) (rejecting neighbor's selves are often hostile to l!'1familiar bors, and 62 percent said they 
17. 42 U.S.CA § 2000cc·5(7)(A). 
estimated there were 3.95 million challenge to city's exempting pro- faiths, to high intensity faiths, and to wou1d not like to have 'members of 18. 42 U.S.CA § 2000cc·5(7)(8). 
Musilms in America. posed 83 foot high spire atop a tern· the conservative and evangelical minority religious sects or cults' as 19. Joint Statement of Senators 
11. "Appendix A, Discrimination pie from normal height restrictions). churches associated with the neighbors. A desire not to have Kennedy and Hatch, 146 Cong. 
Against Minority Churches in 13. See, e.g., Jim Schwab, "Zoning 'Religious Right' Thus in 1993, 45 
marnbers of a minority sect as Rec. 7776-01. (Hereafter "Joint 
Zoning Cases," in Von G. Keetch and Big Box Religion," ZONNG NEws p..-cant of Americans admitted to 
neighbors is cias&f related to a der Statement"). 
Local government reactions to potential RLUIPA claims have run 
the gamut from immediate unconditional surrender at a church's 
mere mention of RLUIPA, to good-faith efforts at compromise ... to 
willingness to litigate the case all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
RLUIPA's "equal treatment" sec-
tion provides that no local government 
"shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that treats a reli-
gious assembly or institution on less 
than equal terms with a nonreligious as-
sembly or institution." 20 The Act's 
"non-discrimination" section prohibits 
land use regulations "that discriminate 
against any assembly or institution on 
the basis of religion or religious denom-
ination. "21 Finally, the Act's "exclusions 
and limits" section provides that "No 
government shall impose or implement 
a land use regulation that: A) totally ex-
cludes religious assemblies from a juris-
diction; or B) unreasonably limits reli-
gious assemblies, institutions, or 
structures within a jurisdiction."22 
Although all of these provisions refer to -
"a religious assembly or institution," 
the Act does not define either term; 
however, their differing treatment in 
the "exclusions and limits" section-
the ban on total exclusion applies only 
to "religious assemblies" -strongly sug-
gests that "religious assembly" is a 
broader term than "religious institu-
tion" and would include, for example, 
informal religious groups that worship 
or study in private homes. · 
RLUIPA also contains a "jurisdic-
tional element" that has been an issue 
in some RLUIPA litigation. Local offi-
cials need only understand that while 
the Act by its terms applies only to 
those land use regulations that permit 
the government to make "individual-
ized assessments" regarding the use of 
the affected property,23 courts have nor-
mally found that almost any required 
zoning approval qualifies as an "indi-
vidualized assessment."24 
HOW TO AVOID A RLUIPA CLAIM 
Advising local officials on how to avoid 
a RLUIPA claim is no easy task. Once 
we are beyond obvious "no-nos" -
things like "don't totally exclude 
·churches" or "don't regulate churches 
in a discriminatory manner" (e.g., re-
quire them to obtain a conditional use 
approval while similar secular uses are 
allowed "as of right")-it is difficult to 
prescribe a list of specific dos and 
don'ts. Each potential RLUIPA claim 
arises within the context of a particular 
site and the implementation of a spe-
cific land use code. Thus, when it 
comes to RLUIPA, the adage that "the 
devil is in the details" is particularly 
apt: It is difficult to provide specific 
guidance absent knowledge of those 
details. Further, similar "RLUIPA 
facts" can yield very different outcomes 
depending on the attitudes and knowl-
edge of the parties involved. 
Local government reactions to po- -
tential RLUIPA claims have run the 
gamut from immediate unconditional 
surrender at a church's mere mention of 
RLUIPA, to good-faith efforts at com-
promise, to willingness, perhaps even 
eagerness, to litigate the case all the 
way to the U.S. Supreme Court. These 
differing reactions are partly explained 
by the facts of particular RLUIPA dis-
putes, but another critical factor is the 
attitude of the parties. If either or both 
of the parties is unwilling to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of, or minimizes, 
the other's concerns, conflict rather 
than compromise is the more likely 
outcome. Thus, for example, some reli-
gious leaders may believe that RLUIPA 
affords them almost carte blanche when 
it comes to complying with land use 
regulations. Similarly, some local offi-
cials may lack sensitivity to the legiti-
mate needs of a particular religious 
group or, on rare occasion, actually view 
a particular religion or sect in a nega-
tive light. 
A final factor making specific advice 
difficult is that the courts have not pro-
vided clear-cut guidance in the 
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RLUIPA decisions issued to date. This 
may be due, in part, to the unique cir-
cumstances of each case, and also due 
to the fact that courts have differed in 
interpreting RLUIPA's provisions. 
Proactive Steps Local Governments Might 
Take to Avoid a RLUIPA Claim 
When it comes to facing an actual 
RLUIPA claim, local government offi-
cials need to understand that some 
claims should not be avoided. RLUIPA 
was enacted to address congressional 
concerns about unfair treatinent of reli-
gious land uses, not to provide religious 
land uses with immunity from land use 
regulation.25 Local officials need to give 
serious consideration to any claim that a 
land use regulation violates RLUIPA, 
- but if after such consideration they de-
cide that the claim lacks merit, they 
should not accede to a violation of a le-
gitimate land use regulation merely to 
avoid possible litigation. 26 
Local officials can seek to avoid a 
potential RLUIPA claim both proac-
tively and reactively. Proactively, local 
governments should examine their land 
use regulations affecting religious uses 
and how those regulations have been 
applied. At a minimum, zoning ordi-
nances should provide reasonable op-
tions for locating new, or expanding, 
houses of worship and such accessory 
religious uses as schools. While provid-
ing such options may not be particu-
larly difficult in newer, less-developed 
communities, it can be a problem in 
older communities that are almost fully 
developed. Such communities may find 
that their current zoning effectively 
precludes houses of worship from resi-
dential areas because no sites are avail-
able, and also severely restricts their lo-
cation in business and industrial areas, 
either because religious uses are seen 
as incompatible in such zones or out of 
a concern for maintaining the city's tax 
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-2(b)(1 ). are neutral laws of general applicabil-
ity, their application to particular facts 
nevertheless can constitute an indi-
vidualized assessment -particularly 
where, as here, the application does 
not invotve a mere numerical or 
mechanistic assessment, but one in-
voMng criteria that are at least par-
tially subjective in nature." But see 
Grace United Methodist Church v. 
City Of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643 
(10th Cir. 2006) (finding that denial of 
variance was not a subjective indMd-
ualized assessment). In addition to 
invoking RLUIPA jurisdiction via an 
"indMdualized assessment," RLUIPA 
plaintiffs claiming that a land use reg-
ulation has imposed a substantial 
burden on religious exercise can also 
seek to invoke jurisdiction ~ the sub-
stantial burden is imposed in connec-
tion with a federally funded actMty or 
where the burden affects interstate HARv. L. REV. 2178 (2007), local gov-
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-2(b)(2). 
22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-2(b)(3). 
23. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-(a)(2). 
24. See, e.g., LMng Water Church 
of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 
384 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1130 
(WO.Mich. 2005), where the court 
stated: " ... even assuming that a 
governmental entity's enactments 
commerce. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ ennments have prevailed in a substan-
2CXXJcc-(a){2)(A) & (8). tial proportion of ail RLUIPA litigation. 
25. Joint Statement, 146 Cong. Rec. 
7776-01. 
26. While RLUIPA claims have fared 
somewhat better than religious use 
claims prior to RLUIPA, see, e.g., 
Note, Religious Land Use in the 
Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 
Local governments should also review the procedural requirements 
of their land use regulations to ensure that they are administered 
fairly and in a nondiscriminatory manner as applied to religious 
institutions. 
base. Where options are effectively 
nonexistent or extremely limited, a 
local government should undertake a 
planning study that seeks to determine 
how it might accommodate the needs 
of religious uses without unduly harm-
ing surrounding property owners. 
Local governments.should.also ex- -
amine whether they have adequate lo-
cational options for "social service" 
uses such as shelters for the homeless 
or victims of domestic abuse and facili-
ties to feed the homeless and indigent. 
The claims of religious institutions that 
a local government must allow them to 
"minister to the poor" at a location of 
their choosing is blunted when a zon-
ing code designates reasonable options 
for both secular and religious groups to 
provide such services. 
Historic preservation ordinances 
should also be reviewed. As a rule, such 
ordinances should not allow landmark 
designation of the interior of a sanctu-
ary without consent of the religious in-
stitution27 and should also contain a 
"hardship" exemption that could be 
applied to a designated structure if the 
church meets appropriate criteria.28 
Local governments should also re-
view the procedural requirements of 
their land use regulations to ensure that 
they are administered fairly and in a 
nondiscriminatory manner as applied to 
religious institutions. Officials need to 
make sure that land use procedures do 
not overtly or inadvertently grant reli-
gious uses favorable or unfavorable 
treatment in the land use regulatory 
process and applications from religious 
uses are treated no differently than 
similar applications from secular uses. 
Finally, local elected officials should 
also consider arranging for "sensitivity 
training" for themselves and other ap-
propriate public employees to enhance 
their awareness of religious differences 
and the need to provide equal treat-
ment to all religious adherents and in-
stitutions. It is far less costly to conduct 
such training before a lack of "sensitiv-
ity" to religious differences results in a 
RLUIPA violation.29 
Reactive Steps Local Governments Should 
Take to Avoid a RLUIPA Claim-
While providing specific substantive 
guidance on avoiding a potential claim 
is difficult, guidance on procedural mat-
ters is more straightforward. Local gov-
ernment officials and staff need to be 
aware that when dealing with either an 
enforcement action or an application for 
a land use approval by a church, extra 
care is advisable, just as it is with other 
land uses-such as adult entertainment 
businesses or signs and billboards-that 
have legal protection beyond the norm. 
For example, when government em-
ployees and officials meet with princi-
pals or representatives of a church to 
discuss a land use application, they 
would be well advised to conclude the 
meeting by confirming with church of-
ficials, in writing, the precise points of 
agreement or disagreement in that dis-
cussion and then follow up with a letter 
or e-mail reiterating that understanding 
and requesting notification if there is 
any disagreement. This practice can 
help to avoid "we said/they said" dis-
putes that could lead to litigation.30 
Another way of taking extra care is 
to establish some type of internal re-
view process when enforcement actions 
target religious uses. The goal here is 
not to exempt churches from enforce-
ment of land use regulations, but rather 
to ensure that churches or, more likely 
a particular church, is not being singled 
out for more frequent or severe en-
forcement that could form the basis for 
a discriminatory treatment claim under 
RLUIPA. 
Cities should also be extremely cau-
tious about departing from well-estab-
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lished precedents when handling a 
church's land use application. Such a 
departure can easily lead to a potential 
RLUIPA claim. For example, in 
Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. 
City of Hollywood, Fla.,3 1 the plaintiff 
synagogue applied for a conditional use 
permit that.would allow it to-use two. 
houses on the edge of a residential dis-
trict for religious worship and study. 
The city granted the permit, but for a 
term of only one year, after which the 
application would have to be reconsid-
ered. The city had considered many 
such applications in the past from both 
churches and secular uses and had 
never previously granted only a "tem-
porary" permit. This different treat-
ment of the plaintiff's application 
ultimately formed one aspect of a suc-
cessful RLUIPA claim that led to a set-
tlement in which the city paid the 
plaintiff $2 million in damages.32 In an-
other case, the district court ruled that 
the city's refusal even to accept a 
church's zoning permit application-
surely a departure from normal proce-
dures--constituted a substantial burden 
on religion. 33 
The big question for local govern-
ments, of course, is how they should re-
spond substantively when a church 
makes a land use application or chal-
lenges an enforcement action. The 
starting point for evaluating whether a 
potential RLUIPA claim can (or should) 
be avoided is to determine whether you 
need to be concerned about RLUIPA in 
the first place: Does the potential claim 
even fall within the protection of the 
statute? Remember that RLUIPA ap-
plies only to "land use regulations;" i.e., 
zoning and historic preservation. Thus, 
while some churches have brought a 
RLUIPA challenge to an exercise of 
eminent domain, except for dicta in a 
footnote in one case, every court that 
has considered the issue has ruled that 
27. Interior designation, because rr 
'freezes" the interior at a point in 
time and thus would disallow 
changes to reflect subsequent doc-
llinal developments, may readiy be 
seen either as imposing a substan-
tial burden on religious exercise or 
violating the estabflShment clause; 
see, e.g., Soc'y of Jesus v. Boston 
Landrnarl<s Comm' n, 409 Mass. 
38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990). 
28. See, generally, Alan C. Wein-
stein, The Myth of Ministry vs. 
Mortar: A Legal and Policy 
Analysis of Landmark Designation 
of Religious Institutions, 65 TEMP. 
L. REv. 91 (1992). 
tion centers, but denying excep-
tion to house of worship, violated 
RLUIPA), where after losing a 
RLUIPA challenge, city officials 
agreed to a settlement that in: 
eluded paying $2 million to the 
RLUIPA plaintiff and agreeing that 
city employees, including elected 
officials, would attend mandatory 
religious sensitMty training. See 
Hollywood to pay $2 million to 
synagogue, MIAMJ HERALD 0"-!NE, 
6/26/06, 2006 WLNR 11054024. 
32. See Hollywood to pay $2 mil-
lion to synagogue, MIAMI HERALD 
ONLINE, 6/26/06, 2006 WLNR 
11054024. 
29. See, e.g., Hollywood Cmty. 
Synagogue, Inc. v. Cfy of 
Hollywood, Fla., 436 F.Supp.2d 
1325 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (granting ex-
ceptions to day care and educa-
30. See, e.g., Ughthouse Cmty. 
Church of God v. Cfy of Southfield 
et al., 2007 WL 30280 (E.D. Mich.) 
(disputing views of whether city offi-
cials ever represented to chLBCh 
that a property could be used for 
religious purposes). 
31. 436 F.Supp.2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 
2006). 
33. See Castle Hills First Baptist 
Church of God v. City of Castle 
Hills, 2004 WL 546792 C/'l.D. Tex. 
2004). 
Most "substantial burden" claims under RLUIPA have relied on 
the "individualized assessments" element, which can easily be met 
when the church is applying for a zoning permit ... or some other 
permit where there is opportunity for the exercise of discretion. 
an exercise of eminent domain is not a 
land use regulation and thus not gov-
erned by RLUIPA.34 
Other cases have found no jurisdic-
tional basis for a claimed RLUIPA vio-
lation where a city had annexed land 
owned by a church;35 a city decided to 
develop a previously dedicated road-
way located between two church-
owned lots;36 a city decided to demol-
ish an old church rather than transfer it 
to a clergyman;37 and where a city had 
denied a telecommunications company 
a permit to construct a transmission 
tower on a golf course. The court ruled 
that action did not invoke RLUIPA ju-
risdiction for a neighboring synagogue 
seeking to intervene in a plaintiff tele-
phone company's challenge to the de-
nial. 38 Other types of regulatory actions 
that are clearly outside RLUIPA's juris-
diction include: building or fire safety 
permits, permits for utility connections, 
and other types of "public health, 
safety, and welfare" permits that are 
outside of either zoning or historical 
preservation codes. 
If a permit application or enforce-
ment action is within the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of RLUIPA, the next 
step in determining whether there 
could be a potential RLUIPA claim is 
to see whether it falls within one of the 
Act's three jurisdictional elements: in-
dividualized assessments, affecting in-
terstate commerce, or involving federal 
funding. These jurisdictional elements 
are only found, however, in the "sub-
stantial burden" section of RLUIPA, 
and thus would not have to be satisfied 
if an enforcement action or denial of a 
permit application could be challenged 
as violating the "equal terms," "nondis-
crimination," or "exclusions and limits" 
sections of RLUIPA.39 Where a poten-
tial claimant could assert that the regu-
lation or its implementation places a 
"substantial burden" on religious exer-
cise, however, the claimant must show 
that one of these jurisdictional ele-
ments has been met. 
Most "substantial burden" claims 
under RLUIPA have relied on the "indi-
vidualized assessments" element, which 
can easily be met when the church is ap-
plying for a zoning permit, conditional 
use permit, variance, or some other per-
mit where there is opportunity for the 
exercise of discretion.40 In contrast, al-
though granting or denying a zoning 
change is clearly discretionary and thus 
would seem to be an "individualized as-
sessment, "41 one court has ruled that it is 
not an "individualized assessment," pre-
sumably because it viewed the rezoning 
as a legislative act involving broad policy 
and political judgments.42 Courts have 
also proven to be relatively sympathetic 
to the claim that a substantial burden on 
religious exercise successfully invokes 
the "affects interstate commerce" juris-
dictional element.43 In short, meeting 
the jurisdictional element should not 
pose a significant problem for a church 
as it considers a potential substantial bur-
den RLUIPA claim. 
We now come to the crux of the 
matter: What should local governments 
do-or refrain from doing -to avoid a 
potential RLUIPA claim when consid-
ering a permit application or an en-
forcement action? 
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In very general terms, local govern-
ments have tended to prevail against 
RLUIPA challenges when they could 
demonstrate that the restrictions placed 
on a church do not target religious uses 
for discriminatory treatment, are neces-
sary to achieve valid land use regula-
tory goals, and do not force the church 
to cease religious worship. Conversely, 
churches have tended to prevail when 
local government was unable to meet 
these same criteria. 
Guidance becomes more difficult 
when we move away from those kinds 
of generalities. "Substantial burden" 
claims are particularly difficult in this 
regard. Recall that RLUIPA does not 
define "substantial burden"; the 
drafters' intent was that courts define 
the term in line with prior precedent. 
That strongly suggested that courts 
would be extremely unlikely to find 
that a land use regulation had imposed 
a substantial burden on a church, but 
that has not been so. While the major-
ity of substantial burden claims have 
failed outside the context of unem-
ployment compensation claims, courts 
have found in a number of cases that 
land use regulations indeed imposed a 
substantial burden on the exercise of 
religion. 44 These differing outcomes 
can be explained in part by the differ-
ent ways that courts have articulated 
what constitutes a "substantial bur-
den." For example, the Seventh 
Circuit has interpreted "substantial 
burden" both quite narrowly-a sub-
stantial burden is imposed only when 
regulations make religious exercise 
"impracticable" within the jurisdiction 
34. See St. John's United Church of 38. Omnlpo!nt Commc'ns, Inc. v. which was triggered when the city Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 718 (9th Cir. 2006), Sts. Constan-
Christ v. City of Chicago, - F.3c - , City of White Plains, 202 F.R.D. received written ccmplaints from F.3c 895 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding tine & Helen Greek Orthodox 
2007 WL 2669403 (7th Cir.), aff'g, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). three individuals residing in three denial of rezoning application to Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 
401 F.Supp.2d 887 (N.D.111. 2005). 39. See, e.g., Mldrash Sephardi, separate households >Mthin 1,500 violate RLUIPA). 396 F.3c 895 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Here, the Seventh Circuit held that Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.2d foot of the property where the park- 42. See Greater Bible Way Dilaura v. Twp. of Am Arbor, 112 
eminent domain was not a land use 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004). ing violation was aileged to have oc- Temple of Jackson v. City of F. App'x 445 (6th Cr. 2004 (per CU· 
regulation, listed other cases in ac- curred. When enforcement was Jackson, 487 Mich. 373, 733 riam); Living Wat.er Church of Goe 
oord, and noted that the only ex- 40. See, e.g., GLU'U Nanak Sikh sought against a rectcxy located in a N.W.2d 734 (2007). v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 384 
ception was dicta in an early Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of reslderitlal district, the court ruled F.Supp.2d 1123 ry.l.D. Mich. 
RLUIPA case, Cottonwood Christian Sutter, 456 F.3c 978, 986 (9th Cir. that this exdusive delegation of en- 43. See, e.g., Cottonwood 2005), Castle Hills FIIBt Baptist 
Center v. Cypress Redevelopment 2006) "stating "RLUIPA appies when forcernent authority constituted a Christian Center v. Cypress Church v. City of Castle Hills, 2004 
Agericy, 218 F.Supp.2d-1203, 1= the government may take into ac- subjective system of indMdualized Redevelopment Agency, 218 WL 546792 ry.l.D. Tex. 2004). 
n. 9 (G.D. Cal. 2002). COlHlt the particular details of an ap- assessment, because enforcement F.Supp.2d 1203, 1221 (G.D. Cal. 
plicant's proposed use of land when was not un~orrn but was left entirely 2002) ("Church actMities have a 
45. See C.L.U.B. V. City of 
35. Vision Church, United deciding to permit or deny that use." significant impact on interstate Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 
Methodist v. Viii. of Long Grove, to the whim of any three individJals One recent case argues that 911· oommerce."). 2003); see also Vision Church, 
468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2006). torcement actions triggered by citl-
who met tre necessary aiteria. See United Methodist v. Viii. of Long 
Town of Foxfield v. Archdiocese of 44. See, e.g., Guru Nank Sikh 
36. Prater v. City of Burnside, Ky., zen oomp!alnts can also oonstitute Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 
289 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002). an "indMdualized assessment.· In 
Denver, 148 P.3c 339 (Colo. App. Soc'y of Yuba City v. Comly of 2006) and Petra Presbyterian 
that case, the city had enacted an 
2006). Sutter, 456 F.3c 978 (9th Cir. Church v. Viii. of Northbrook, 
37. Taylor v. City of Gery, Ind., 2007 
ordinance restricting per\<ing in resi- 41. See, e.g., Sts. Constantine & 
2006); Elsinore Christian Center v. 489 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2007). 
WL 1317130 (7th Cir.) (unreported). 
dentlal districts, enforcement of Helen Greek Orthodox Church, 
City of Lake Elsinore, 197 F. App'x 
We are clearly in the midst of a dynamic environment so-
cially, politically, and legally regarding the role of religion in 
our society, and RLUIPA reflects this in the context of po-
tential conflicts between churches and land use regulation. 
generally45-and more broadly: A sub-
stantial burden could be based on 
delay, uncertainty, and expense.46 
These different interpretations, 
when combined with the unique fac-
tual settings of each case, have yielded 
outcomes that are difficult to reconcile. 
For example, the 11th Circuit found no 
substantial burden when a synagogue 
was prohibited from locating in a down-
town business district,47 while the 
Ninth Circuit upheld a district court 
ruling that found a substantial burden 
where the city had denied approval for 
a church's preferred site in a downtown 
business district.48 
It is easier to provide guidance on 
avoiding a RLUIPA claim based on 
the other provisions of RLUIPA. 
Local officials obviously need to avoid 
even the appearance of unequal treat-
ment or discrimination-whether for 
or against-a particular church or sect, 
or treating religious uses on less than 
equal terms with secular uses. But 
even here, some court decisions sug-
gest guidance is not so easy. For ex-
ample, in the 11th Circuit case noted 
above, religious uses were not allowed 
in the central business district-where 
secular assembly uses were allowed-
but churches could locate in residen-
tial districts where secular assembly 
uses were prohibited.49 From either a 
planning or legal perspective, one 
might argue that while the treatment 
of the secular and religious uses was 
different, that different treatment did 
not violate RLUIPA's equal terms pro-
vision because the code "equalized" 
its treatment of the uses. While reli-
gious uses were barred from a district 
where secular uses were allowed, reli-
gious uses were allowed in a district 
where secular uses were prohibited. 
The best advice to local officials on 
how to avoid a potential RLUIPA 
claim may well be less legal and more 
just common sense: Treat church rep-
resentatives fairly and with respect 
and try to engage in a good-faith ef-
fort to craft a reasonable compromise 
between the church's request and 
achieving the city's land use policies. 
As a federal judge noted in one of the 
first reported RLUIPA cases involving 
a city's enforcement action to limit 
the number of attendees at prayer 
services held in a private home: 
Even absent a federal statute, one 
would expect that, before banning an 
ongoing private religious gathering, 
public officials in a free and tolerant 
society would enter into a dialogue 
with the participants to determine if 
the legitimate safety concerns of the 
neighbors could be voluntarily allayed. 
Particularly where the participants are 
enjoined by religious teachings to "do 
unto others" as they would have done 
unto them, it is not unreasonable to ex-
pect the parties to be able to agree on 
means of reducing the impact of 
weekly prayer meetings on this small 
cul-de-sac without undermining the 
benefit that participants seek to derive 
from the practice of their faith.50 
It's important to note that the judge 
enjoined both sides to enter into dia-
logue to seek a reasonable compromise. 
Avoiding a potential claim is clearly not 
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solely the burden of local officials. 
Church officials have, in some cases, 
been dismissive of legitimate land use 
concerns and pursued claims that bor-
dered on the frivolous. But where both 
sides are willing to seek common 
ground, there is certainly often room 
for compromise. 
CONCLUSION 
We are clearly in the midst of a dy-
namic environment socially, politi-
cally, and legally regarding the role of 
religion in our society, and RLUIPA 
reflects this in the context of potential 
conflicts between churches and land 
use regulation. Congress has at-
tempted to empower churches when 
they choose where and how they 
build a sanctuary or assemble for wor-
ship and to restrain local governments 
when they seek to apply zoning or 
landmark regulations to a church 
when the congregation objects. In this 
environment, local governments face a 
difficult task in seeking to avoid 
RLUIPA potential claims and evaluat-
ing their likelihood of prevailing if 
challenged. Local officials can, how-
ever, take several steps to lessen the 
likelihood of a potential claim, includ-
ing a comprehensive review of the 
treatment of religious institutions in 
its land use codes, both substantively 
and procedurally; training officials and 
employees to be sensitive to religious 
differences; and recognizing that land 
use applications from, and enforce-
ment of regulations against, religious 
institutions must be handled with 
special care. 
46. Sts. Constantine & Helen 
Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. 
City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 
(7th Cir. 2005). 
47. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. 
Town of SLBfside, 366 F.2d 1214 
(11th Cir. 2004); however, that court 
also found that the ban violated 
RLUIPA's equal terms provision. 
48. Elsinore Christian Center v. 
City of Lake Elsinore, 197 F. App'x 
718 (9th Cir. 2006), reversing, 291 
F.Supp.2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
49. Mldrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town 
of Surfside, 366 F.2d 1214 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
50. Murphy v. Zoning Comm'n of 
Town of New Mittord, 148 
F.Supp.2d 173, 191 (D.Conn. 
2001). 
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